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**THREE PERSPECTIVES ON  
DEVELOPMENT  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE  
WELFARE SYSTEMS OF EAST ASIAN  
NICs**

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**Introduction**

It is widely accepted that the industrialisation processes of Korea and Taiwan, two East Asian "Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs),<sup>1</sup> are central to understanding the general situation of Third World countries, not only because they have shown impressive economic development during the past three or four decades, but also because they indicate both the possibilities and limitations of Third World development. Compared with the detailed research on the industrialisation of these two, too little attention has been devoted to their welfare systems, which have been regarded by many western scholars as "part and parcel of the industrialisation process."<sup>2</sup> This is mainly due to the historical nature of the

study of social policy as an academic discipline. Welfare systems have been virtually left out of analyses, and academic studies are exclusively devoted to the adoption of western welfare systems in general and the British system in particular.<sup>3</sup>

However, it is noteworthy that, since the late 1970s, there has been a growing interest in the welfare systems of Third World countries. Some academics within the tradition of British social administration have attempted to account for their development.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, academic studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s paved the way towards opening a debate about such systems and considerably contributed to the development of this discipline. The studies commonly argue that, for such attempts to be fruitful, welfare systems should be researched within the wider context in which they have developed and been implemented. Seen in this light, it seems necessary to draw attention to the main approaches on Third World development.

In the first section of my paper, recent changes of approaches in the field of development studies, from Developmentalism to *Dependencia* and Statism,<sup>5</sup> will be explained using the Kuanian concept of paradigmatic change. I then attempt to identify the role of the state in East Asian NIC development. My third section looks for relationships between the states and the welfare enactments of Korea and Taiwan. My working conclusion is that the state has played a key role in the welfare state developments of both countries, and thus, although the Statist theory provides the most balanced view, none of the three approaches exactly dovetails with the welfare systems.

### Paradigmatic Changes in Development Studies

It is commonly argued amongst social scientists that the second half of the twentieth century widely witnessed a "chaos of paradigm," "crisis of paradigm" or a "paradigm lost." In fact, at least in social science, no single dominant theory has ever accounted for all the details of societal circumstances. However, there has been a period when most people believed that human reason could recognise and elucidate the laws of historical development. At least from their perspective, the world is simply explained by two different phenomena—recognised and unexplored phenomena (which will become recognised with the further development of human reason). For instance, great social scientists such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and more recently Parsons, persistently attempted, and eventually completed, grand theories through which the world could be universally understood. Each firmly believed that their individual theory was sufficiently developed to be applied to any particular situation. Indubitably such an age was the age of human reason.

It would be very reasonable to suggest that the "chaos of paradigm" has deepened and intensified in the late 20th century, although the methodologies of social science have developed along with the development of statistics and social research methods both in quality and quantity. Why? We may focus on the nature of the crisis itself. Is it merely a theoretical or paradigmatic crisis, not a crisis of the real world? Actually, whilst the real world moves according to its own law of motion or movement, scholars have from time to time attempted to articulate it into their own framework in the name of human reason. When the gap between real and interpreted is so huge that deviant cases or anomalies are frequently found, then the "crisis of paradigm" appears, when the old paradigm is likely to be replaced by a new paradigm. Essentially it is this process of change which Thomas Kuhn dealt with<sup>6</sup>. He argues that the

development of science can be regarded as the sequential change of paradigms. True, the paradigm, adopted individually or communally, has been held central in the development of science. Meanwhile, Kuhn defines a paradigm in a somewhat ambiguous way:<sup>7</sup>

These and many other works served to define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners. They were able to do so because they shared two essential characteristics. Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.

Thus;

Achievement that share these two characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as "Paradigms."

Hunt defines paradigm more succinctly:<sup>8</sup>

...that constellation of values, beliefs and perception of empirical reality, which, together with a body of theory based upon the foregoing, is used by a group of scientists, and by applying a distinctive methodology, to interpret the nature of some aspect of the universe we inhabit.

Upon these bases, four essential natures of such a paradigm can be derived. Firstly, a paradigm does not simply consist of a set of theories, but involves the belief, values and ideological preferences of specific research matters.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, legitimate research problems and methodologies are identified within it. Thirdly, the process of paradigm change is not piecemeal or evolutionary, but revolutionary. Lastly, paradigm legitimacy is closely related to the dynamics of competing academic schools.

Kuhn set up his ideas of paradigm on the historical basis of natural science, not social science. Thus various difficulties coincide if one attempts to apply the Kuhnian concept in social science, and Kuhn himself considered social science was not yet as fully developed as natural

science, regarding it as being pre-paradigmatic.<sup>10</sup> In fact, unlike natural sciences, no dominant paradigm or way of thinking has ever existed in social science and, consequently, it has been characterised as a compatibility of competing paradigms.<sup>11</sup> Social science has had no equivalent of the Newtonian revolution through which the world is universally recognised. However, this does not necessarily assume that paradigm change has no implications for social science disciplines. At least if social science were to be "guided by something much like a paradigm"<sup>12</sup>, it would be worth applying the concept of paradigm change. Undoubtedly, something much like a paradigm, however defined, is absolutely necessary in social science, because "the idea of working without one [paradigm] is not just impracticable but perhaps inconceivable."<sup>13</sup>

It is worth noting that some attempts have already been made to explain the shifting frameworks of development studies, which closely resemble Kuhnian paradigm change. Foster-Carter (1976)<sup>14</sup> argues "that Kuhn's concept of scientific development helps us to understand the changes that have taken place in the theory of development and underdevelopment."<sup>15</sup> He draws attention to the paradigm change from mainstream Western development theory to dependency theory (*Dependencia*). He discusses two representative scholars belonging to the two conflicting schools, Rostow and Frank and argues that the rise of neo-Marxism as a new paradigm is explained by the crisis or collapse of developmentalism, the old paradigm, a crisis which resulted from the overall failure of development strategies in nearly all Third World countries. He exemplifies the change in Frank's framework as a paradigm change in development studies. Frank, once a faithful follower of the Chicago School of Economics, transformed himself into a radical dependency theorist. In regard to this change, Foster-Carter argues:<sup>16</sup>

It is unlikely that Frank simply forgot all this [conventional economics], or went mad. A far more reasonable explanation is paradigm change.

However, Foster-Carter does not seem to fully appreciate the limitations of single case study as a sociological methodology. For such an approach to be fulfilled, he should have analysed the historical context of Third World countries, within which Frank's change occurred. Although Frank, without dispute, is the leading theorist in the circle of *Dependencia*<sup>17</sup>, his paradigm change cannot be researched apart from the historical context to which it belongs. In this regard, the work of Chilcote<sup>18</sup> seems to provide a broader viewpoint. Rather than comparing the personal historiography of representative scholars, he claims that the paradigm change in development studies resulted from the vigorous challenge of historicism, traced back to the works of Marx and Engels as historicists and to the orthodox social science paradigm of liberalism and positivism. Frank's paradigm change is a dramatic reflection of the intellectual movement of the 1960s as well as reflecting disappointment with the "promises of developmentalism" in developing countries.

In spite of the criticisms of his work, Foster-Carter gives us a valuable clue about the paradigm change:<sup>19</sup>

Presumably in the natural sciences the eventually complete victory of a rising paradigm renders communication with the old one unnecessary. But in the social sciences, at least in this particular instance, one would not expect the neo-Marxist paradigm to ever achieve such a dominant role. We therefore have the prospect of a prolonged period of coexistence within a single scientific community of two radically incompatible paradigms.

And he concludes:<sup>20</sup>

What happens in the developing world, as perceived via the respective paradigms, must affect their respective fortunes.

From the above quote, we can abstract two interrelated implications for development studies. First of all, it can be broadly assumed that a new paradigm will not totally replace the old one. And, at least in development studies, the process of paradigm change can be assumed to be basically evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than sudden, since two apparently incompatible paradigms are likely to communicate with each other. Or at least, neither will totally ignore the other. Thus we can assume that there is a room for compromise. The first implication refers to the characteristic of paradigm change, but the second one is directly concerned with the process of change; the patterns of development in the Third World—the real world—have a decisive impact on the patterns of paradigm change in development studies. This means that paradigm change in social science can be viewed as the reflection of a dynamically changing world, unlike that used in natural science.

#### **Role of the state in East Asian NIC development**

As dependency theory (*Dependencia*) emerged from the crisis of mainstream Western development theory (Developmentalism), Statism developed as a further paradigm. Since the late 1970s, anomalies in dependency theory have been frequently seen in developing countries, and thus the legitimate problems and methods of a research field within *Dependencia* have been challenged. These deviant cases, which include the economic prosperity of Taiwan and Korea, threaten the basic proposition of dependency theory, that "the closer the economic relationship between metropolis (centre) and satellite (periphery) is, the less the economic development of the latter will be." Numerous working papers, articles and books show that the East Asian NICs represent a strong challenge

to the basic assumption that foreign economic penetration leads, firstly, to a hindrance of the economic sector and, secondly, to a widening of economic inequality across the classes.

Meanwhile, there is growing interest in the contrasting phenomena that East Asian NIC economic performance brought a paradigm change from *Dependencia* to Statism, whilst the remarkable 1970s economic development of Latin American NICs—Brazil and Mexico—delivered only a modification to dependency theory, the "dependent development" of Peter Evans.<sup>21</sup> Why is it that the former brought paradigm change, whilst the latter delivered simply a modification? The fact that the paradigm changed implies that the gap between the real world and interpretations through the old paradigm is so huge that the basic proposition and the legitimate research problem defined within the old paradigm is no longer pertinent. Seen in this light, the notion of "dependent development" might be appraised as paradigm change, not because it does not adhere to the basic principle of dependency theory, but because it leaves ample room for developing countries to achieve rapid economic growth. Evans explains the successful development of the Brazilian economy in the 1960s through the frame of a triple alliance of state, local capitalists and multinationals, and argues that the role of the state in promoting economic growth is far greater than the roles of the other two sectors.<sup>22</sup> "Dependency" and "development" are not necessarily contradictory terms. However, two papers published in the early 1980s, one dealing with Korea and the other with Taiwan, suggest we must have serious reservations about applying the frame of a triple alliance to East Asian NICs.<sup>23</sup> The role of the state in Korea and Taiwan has been far more influential than in Latin American NICs. Moreover, the concept of "dependent development" does not leapfrog the basic arguments of *Dependencia*, because it assumes that "dependent

development" is basically dependent on foreign capital, and thus the surplus value of economic growth is constantly exploited by foreign capital through multinational corporations. The economies of "dependent development" might achieve substantial growth in volume, but are hardly able to realize solid development.

Here it seems worth distinguishing the concept of development from growth. It has been popular to identify economic growth with economic development in development studies until very recently. This was mainly due to the fact that economic growth, for instance the increase in GNP, can be measured in quantity, whilst economic development is hard to measure by a universally-accepted yardstick. Moreover, even the definition of development varies widely according to different ideological preferences and academic backgrounds, mainly because of a highly normative implication. For research in development studies to be fruitful, it appears vital to distinguish solid development from mere growth in volume. If growth fails, the economies of unfair privileges, characterised by extremely concentrated wealth, persistent inequalities, and tremendous imbalance across sectors will mistakenly be identified with economic development. Without improving the quality of life, it is hard to assume that any economy is now on the way to development. We can approach this problem by asking to what extent, and under what condition, are development and growth different from each other. And in regard to this, a United Nations report defines development as "growth plus change."<sup>24</sup> Similarly, the Brandt Report states:<sup>25</sup>

Certainly development must mean improvement in living conditions, for which economic growth and industrialisation are essential. But if there is no attention to the quality of growth and to social change one cannot speak of development. It is now widely recognised that development involves a profound transformation of the entire economic and social structure.

Lesson and Nixson express a similar viewpoint:<sup>26</sup>

Here are implied two distinct meanings of the term 'economic development': (i) development equals growth plus structural change; (ii) development equals growth plus income redistribution and/or other measures to improve welfare.

Following the above, it can be further assumed that development should bring improvements in the "quality of life," whereas growth simply refers to an increase in GNP, and therefore economic growth achieved without improving general welfare does not lead to a paradigm change. However it would be too impetuous to assume that the economies of East Asian NICs, irrespective of whether they manifest higher growth rates or appear as developed countries, should demonstrate structural transformations which improve the general welfare of the society. There is a definite need for in-depth research into the distribution structure, political system and level of democratisation in order to assess whether their economic achievements can be appraised as solid development. Furthermore, a number of comparative research results suggest that, as far as the distribution structure is concerned, there are considerable variations amongst East Asian NICs. Atul Kohli, *et al*, in their study about inequality in the Third World,<sup>27</sup> found a sharp contrast between Korea and Taiwan in the initial phase of industrialisation. Whereas Korea was classified as one of the "Countries Showing Significant Rise in Inequality" in 1960-1970, Taiwan was grouped with the "Countries Showing Significant Drop in Inequality."<sup>28</sup> The average Gini coefficient of Korea during the first half of the 1980s was 0.363, whilst that of Taiwan was only 0.287. However the Gini coefficient of Korea was very near that of developed countries, though that of Taiwan has not improved much since the 1970s.<sup>29</sup> Although some variation has remained in the income distribution between these two economies, they have shared more common features of economic development for the last three or four decades. From poor

tradition-oriented agricultural countries, they manifested impressive economic growth. The total exports of the four East Asian NICs have recorded over double the total exports of all other developing countries since the mid-1980s, and their economic growth rates are the highest in the world.<sup>30</sup> The Taiwan economy achieved an average 9% economic growth rate from 1950-1985, while the Korean economy between 1962-1986 performed an average around 8.5%. Quite simply, they have maintained high growth rates, high investment rates and, probably most importantly, high dependency on the world market. It can be argued that they are moving towards the status of developed economies.<sup>31</sup> Attempts have been made to account for the cause and effect of such successful economic growth amongst East Asian NICs in comparison with what has happened in frustrated and still backward economies. These commonly draw attention to the distinct characteristics of East Asian societies such as the Confucian tradition, experiences of Japanese colonialism, relatively educated but low-waged labour forces, weak class struggles, strong and competent states, and so forth. Amongst these characteristics, the role of the state, without dispute, is central to account for the impressive economic growth, and thus the state has been brought back to central stage in social science in general, and in development studies in particular.<sup>32</sup>

It seems quite clear that neither modernisation nor dependency schools could provide adequate conceptual frameworks through which the economic development of East Asian NICs could be analysed. Foster Carter argues that:<sup>33</sup>

South Korea's success is a profound theoretical embarrassment to both neo-classical economists and dependency theorists.

Above all, the failure of dependency theory to account for the unique industrialisation of the region has increased the scepticism about the adequacy of Third World

development theory, and has accelerated the need for a new paradigm able to encompass the Third World as a whole. There have been various noteworthy attempts to escape the theoretical impasse of dependency theory. Some have actively embraced the academic achievements which have emerged from other disciplines, while some have abandoned the theoretical and conceptual strait-jacket, and others still have become more practical.<sup>34</sup> However, it can be said that these found ways to escape the impasse, but failed to find a way forward. Debates on the state provide a good starting point for seeking a new paradigm for development studies since the role and function of the state in developing societies, as it was defined in the early literature of *Dependencia*, was not viewed positively in relation to Third World development. Rather, the state was widely regarded as a mere bureaucratic apparatus controlled and dominated by the petty-bourgeois, "by a coalition of political parties [or a single party] that represent[s] the class interests of the comprador bourgeois, the feudal landlord class, and the metropolitan imperial bourgeois."<sup>35</sup> Because of the radical changes in the political situation of Third World countries, the concept of state has now somewhat changed. A concept of "relative autonomy" has been applied to the development experiences of individual countries, and a number of structural conditions which contribute to the autonomy of the state have been presented.<sup>36</sup> Now the state is held central in the debates on Third World development. Kohli argues:<sup>37</sup>

No coherent "third" alternative to the modernization and dependency approaches has emerged...Some analytical concerns have been voiced by scholars who are troubled by the tendency in both the modernization and the dependency approaches to reduce politics to socio-economic variables...They are attempting to highlight the significance of political variables...for patterns of political-economic change in developing countries.

In Pye's study of Asian countries, he argues that "the priority should be to find a theoretical lens that will ensure

both a vivid focus on the political domain and a long historical perspective."<sup>38</sup> However, it is too early to assume that the old paradigm will be replaced by the new Statism. Most scholars of development studies argue that the state-led development experiences of East Asian NICs are exceptional cases,<sup>39</sup> and "a proliferation of state activity undertaken in the name of development has not resulted in the anticipated improvements in socio-economic welfare"<sup>40</sup> in most developing countries. Hulme and Turner are quite right to argue that "the bureaucracies are often ill-equipped to perform these tasks [of developmental policy-making, planning, implementation and evaluation] effectively and efficiently."<sup>41</sup> Thus, "if development is to succeed and the state is to retain its principal role in it then the bureaucracy has to make dramatic improvements in managing development."<sup>42</sup>

Historically the East Asian NICs and Japan have been, to varying degrees, strongly influenced by Chinese culture. In fact, Hong Kong and Taiwan were peripheral regions of China until they were occupied by colonial forces, and Korea and Japan tried to assimilate the advanced Chinese culture, though they retained their own national identities. Meanwhile, up until the 18th century, China was one of the most civilized and prosperous nations in the world.<sup>43</sup> Of particular importance was China's unified hierarchic administration run by a well-educated Confucian bureaucracy.<sup>44</sup>

Thus it is mainly due to historical experience that the states of these societies have developed autonomy from both domestic classes and foreign capital, leading to independent development policies. In regard to this extraordinary endemic characteristic, Cal Clark argues:<sup>45</sup>

All the successful East Asian countries (Japan, the four little dragons, and the P.R.C.) were marked by strong states committed to developmentalist policies, and all shared a

Confucian culture that, among other things, included respect and veneration for political authorities.

Ironically Confucianism was blamed for the economic backwardness of Asian countries by such Western scholars as Max Weber,<sup>46</sup> who thought that the Protestant ethic was much superior, at least in respect to a country's industrialisation. Now the tradition of Confucianism is commonly seen as the key factor leading to rapid economic development in East Asia. Modern Confucianism is understood by many social scientists as the combination of advantageous terms from both worlds—"an amalgam of family or collectively-oriented values of the East and the pragmatic economic goal-oriented value of the West."<sup>47</sup> However this culturally oriented assumption of development is not sufficiently abstract to be universally applicable, though it provides a good starting point for building up a general interpretation. Kwōn argues:<sup>48</sup>

The new Confucian ethic covers a broader spectrum of economic growth in Asian countries, including Japan and Asian NICs...Perhaps what we need is a general socio-cultural theory of economic development that transcends ethnocentrism implicit in the 'Protestant ethic' and 'new Confucian ethic'.

The role of the state in the industrialisation process of the East Asian NICs was remarkable, and also quite different from that of other developing countries, whether they are "state capitalism,"<sup>49</sup> "entrepreneurial,"<sup>50</sup> "bureaucratic state capitalism,"<sup>51</sup> "bureaucratic-authoritarian industrialising regimes,"<sup>52</sup> or "neo-mercantile."<sup>53</sup> However, as is clearly shown above, it is questionable whether their experiences have some general applicability to other developing countries, do they show the replacement of a paradigm from *Dependencia* to Statism. What is urgently needed is to inquire into the general theoretical lens which explains Third World development as a whole, and furthermore directs the right way of development. As has been shown, development does not

have to be confined to economic growth. Rather, it should be understood as a progressive process of improvement in the quality of human life in a given society. In this regard, one way out of the theoretical impasse in which development studies are entrenched is to draw more attention to the role of the state in other societal sectors such as welfare systems. Actually, existing research is exclusively focused on the industrialisation process of East Asian NICs, and too little attention has been devoted to welfare systems. Chow notes:<sup>54</sup>

...attention has so far been focused on their industrialising experiences and little has been documented about their social security provision, which is often seen in the West as part and parcel of the industrialisation process.

#### State and Welfare: Political Crisis and Welfare Enactment of Korea and Taiwan

Academic attention has never been solely drawn to the welfare sector in the literature of development studies,<sup>55</sup> due in part to the fact that the literature relies on what are basically society-centred theories that tend to underestimate the role and function of the public sector. Within the context of Developmentalism, it is quite clear that welfare activities have a minimal or residual role and function in modern societies, while voluntary services have a key role in dealing with social problems. Welfare is mainly oriented towards psychological treatment or, at best, a minimum level of assistance for people in extreme poverty. However, when viewed against the socio-economic situation of mass poverty, unemployment and immense deprivation in developing countries, the concept of residualism has been gradually eroded.<sup>56</sup> Again, from the *Dependencia* perspective, the welfare systems of developing countries are left out of the analysis; relatively few writers have discussed the policy implications of welfare systems, mainly because



of a pessimistic premise on reform in Third World countries. Roxborough thus asserts that reform is hardly realised on account of the dependency situation:<sup>57</sup>

the dependency paradigm alerts us to the fact that much-needed reforms are impossible without a restructuring of the mode of articulation of the economy with the world economy.

The preoccupation with unequal relations between the centre and the periphery and, ultimately, with the socialist revolution, prevents many dependency writers from researching Third World welfare systems. Reforms through policy-making processes including welfare seem to be unthinkable in the dependency context. Now, research trends about Third World welfare systems tend accordingly to lean toward Statist theory. What is at issue is whether the state in dependent societies can adopt or expand welfare programmes with full-fledged autonomy both from domestic social forces and foreign capital.

The importance of the state in modern capitalist or socialist societies cannot be too strongly emphasized. Since the great panic at the end of 1920s, the role of the state has increased dramatically not only in traditional state businesses such as legal and institutional sectors, but also in the economic sphere which was largely left to the private sector until only a few decades ago. The modern capitalist state has directly or indirectly participated in production through the nationalisation of industries. Furthermore, the growing portion of public expenditure in the whole GNP has illustrated how great the role of the capitalist state in modern societies has become. For example, the total public expenditure as a percentage of GNP in 1890 when the welfare state was born in Britain was only 8.9%, but in 1930 it was 26.1% and in 1979—when the welfare state was at the height of its prosperity—51.8%.<sup>58</sup> At the heart of the rise of public expenditure was a considerable increase in social service expenditure which rose from 1.9% in 1890 to 27.6% in 1979.<sup>59</sup> Based on a widespread consensus concerning

social democracy, the Western capitalist states ambitiously launched welfare states and promised welfare "from the cradle to the grave." Mishra identifies the factors which gave legitimacy to this in those promising decades: an "affluent society with full employment," the "Keynes and Beveridge rationale for state intervention," "theories of industrial society," the "promise of a social science" and the "pursuit of socialism through welfare."<sup>60</sup>

There is a growing interest in variations in capitalist states, rather than a single dominant explanation applied to all. Especially, the state in the context of dependent capitalism is, at least in appearance, not in accordance with the basic features of the state in developed countries, despite variation. Duvall and Freeman state:<sup>61</sup>

There are, in the modern world system, importantly different types of capitalist societies. That is to say, the capitalist mode of production is expressed in *fundamentally* distinct forms; as a result, the basic character, the nature, the role of the state differ substantially across societies.

However, as they note, this does not have to imply the acceptance of a doctrine of complete social uniqueness, but rather that the constructive "sociological imagination"<sup>62</sup> within a historical perspective is absolutely necessary for debates about the role of the state in capitalist societies, precisely because it differs considerably between different societies. Actually the gap between rhetoric and reality would remain huge if states are studied separately from the historical complex to which they belong. However, in spite of considerable variations between societies, the following common feature shared by all capitalist states is at the heart of the concept of the state:<sup>63</sup>

...the core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will.

This allows us to make several generalisations about the nature of the state. Firstly, the state apparatus consists of an orchestra of organisations and institutions, which together makes a very unique and characteristic sound. The function of state apparatus is not, and will not simply be understood as the activities of state personnel, but as complicated processes of state intervention. Actually, as is argued by Therborn, "if the state is no more than the government elite, there would seem to be no need for any state theory."<sup>64</sup> Secondly, "to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society" implies that only the state, not the civil society, is bound to decide what is to be done within a given political context. The ruling class in any society does not govern directly or explicitly, but just exercises an important affect on the decision-making process of the state. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state acts, at least in appearance, "in the name of common interest or general will," which explains why legitimacy is so important for state activities. The modern state, however defined, should manifest itself as a neutral agent through which various interests in a society are incorporated.

If we think about the political context within which the welfare state developed, the following assumptions apply. Firstly, the main architect of the postwar welfare state is not a specific government body in charge of operating the system, nor bureaucrats, yet the state can be understood "as a bureaucratic apparatus and institutional legal order in its totality."<sup>65</sup> However, this does not mean that ordinary citizens or political parties have had little effect on the welfare state. Secondly, it is the state that decides the timing of the enactment and enforcement of specific welfare policies, and the contents of services such as "in cash" or "in kind," despite various interest groups being involved in the decision-making processes. The ultimate political responsibility of running the welfare system belongs to the

state, not to the people, nor to any political party. Thirdly, if the state, for whatever reason, has launched and maintained welfare programs at a vast cost,<sup>66</sup> it can be assumed that they have enjoyed broad political and societal support, and henceforth the welfare state has been fully legitimized.

The basic assumption of Statism is that the state plays a key role in economic development, social security and individual liberty.<sup>67</sup> So let us see how the enactment of welfare programs in Korea and Taiwan presents the state, especially when the regime is in great political crisis.

Figure 1<sup>68</sup> shows the relation between political crises and welfare enactment in Korea since the 1960s. It demonstrates that the state, however defined, decides the timing of enactment of welfare programs in an attempt to tranquillise domestic political crises.

Compared with this, the most serious crisis occurring in Taiwanese politics came from severed diplomatic relationships, not from domestic problems. In 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan, one of the founders of the United Nations, was forced to withdraw. Since then, the number of countries recognizing the People's Republic of China has exceeded those recognizing the Republic of China. Furthermore, the United States, once the strongest supporter of the R.O.C. government, severed diplomatic relations in 1979, and officially recognised the P.R.C. as the *de jure* government in China. This deepened the political isolation of Taiwan, and brought about serious subsequent domestic crises. It is noteworthy that welfare enactments were actively made around two serious crises. Figure 2 demonstrates the strong correlation between political crisis and welfare enactment. The trend of welfare expenditure also shows momentary increases, from 12.7% of government expenditure in 1972 to 15.2% in 1982.





Fig. 1.



Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, CEPD, 1990  
Yearbook of Financial Statistics, MOF, 1988

Fig. 2.

The figures give a clue as to how, why and in what respects politics have influenced welfare state development in two societies. In conclusion, if we examine the political context within which welfare programmes were enacted in Korea and Taiwan, the following arguments can be proposed. Since it is the state which decides the timing of the enactment and enforcement of specific welfare policies, the ultimate political responsibility of running the welfare system belongs to the state. And, when the state has introduced welfare programs in the middle of political crisis, and has maintained them at vast costs, welfare programs are basically designed to secure political and social support from the population.

In this regard, then, existing accounts<sup>69</sup> about the development of Third World welfare systems are seriously challenged, and Statist theory, as an alternative conceptual framework, provides a more balanced view.

NOTES

1 According to the OECD, Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) are defined as "fast growing of the level and share of industrial employment, an enlargement of export market shares in manufactures and a rapid relative reduction in the per capita income gap separating them from the advanced industrial countries." See, OECD, *The Impact of the NICs on Production and Trade in Manufactures* (OECD, Paris, 1979). Undoubtedly, it would be very hard to make a definite list of NICs because different indicators include different countries. However, the following countries are normally referred to as NICs: Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Spain. See, B. Crow and A. Thomas, *Third World Atlas* (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1983), pp.48-9.

- 2 N. Chow, "Social Security Provision in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea: A Comparative Analysis", a working paper presented to the Social Administration Association, 1985.
- 3 This "parochialism" or "ethnocentrism" has been severely criticised from the outset. For more details, refer to R. Pinker, *Social Theory and Social Policy* (Heinemann, London, 1971); R. Mishra, *Society and Social Policy* (Macmillan, London, 1981); P. Townsend, *Sociology and Social Policy* (Allen Lane, London, 1975).
- 4 Refer to the voluminous working papers, articles and books of J. Midgley, H. Jones, M. Hardiman and S. McPherson. Actually it is true that before they raised research questions about Third World welfare systems, working papers conducted by international organisations such as United Nations and World Bank can be evaluated as simple fact-finding surveys.
- 5 These three schools have been widely accepted as the mainstream theories of development studies. However, different scholars of opposing ideological and theoretical standpoints may replace them with new schools of thought. For example, Laite presents four mainstream frameworks in the sociology of development: developmentalism, dependency, modes of production and political economy in P. F. Lesson and M. M. Minogue (eds), *Perspectives on Development: Cross-disciplinary Theme in Development Studies* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988).
- 6 T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970).
- 7 *Ibid*, p.10.
- 8 D. Hunt, *Economic Theories of Development: An analysis of competing paradigms* (Hemel Hempstead, 1989), p.2.
- 9 It is in this regard that paradigm change is brought about by either a logical experiment or by a judgement, belief or subjective choice. See M. Havey, *Explanation of Geography* (Edward Arnold, London, 1969) and R. Young and J. Petch, "The Methodological Limitations of Kuhn's Model of Science", *Discussion Papers in Geography* 8 (University of Salford, May 1978).
- 10 Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," *World Development*, 4:3 (March 1976), p.170; T. Kuhn, *op. cit.* p.xi.

- 11 Voluminous criticisms commonly indicate a much more rigid interpretation of paradigms, as well as vagueness about the nature of the rules that the scientific community uses. See D. Hunt, *op. cit.* Ch. 1, and R. Young and J. Petch, *op. cit.* See also I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970). Thus Kuhn, in the 1970 edition of his work, modifies his original view that mature sciences were dominated by a single school of thought. He recognises the possibility of compatibility between paradigms in mature sciences. However, it can be assumed that there remains huge differences in the possibility of compatibility between social science and natural science.
- 12 Kuhn, *Ibid*, p.170.
- 13 Kuhn, *Ibid*, p.169.
- 14 Foster-Carter claims that his paper is the first attempt to apply Kuhn's paradigm change to development studies. See *Ibid*, p.168.
- 15 *Ibid*. p.177.
- 16 *Ibid*. p.176.
- 17 It is widely accepted that André Gunder Frank is pioneer of the dependency theory. See, for example, D. Booth, "André Gunder Frank: an introduction and appreciation," in I. Oxaal, *et al* (eds), *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975) and D. Hulme and M. Turner, *Sociology and Development* (Harvest Wheatsheaf, London, 1990), particularly chapter 3. Amongst Frank's influential works, "The Development of Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review*, 18:4 (September 1966), is particularly important because his five hypotheses provided the basis for subsequent development of *Dependencia*.
- 18 See R. Chilcote, "A Question of Dependency," *Latin American Research Review*, 13:2 (1978), pp.55-68.
- 19 Foster-Carter, *op. cit.* p.176.
- 20 *Ibid*. p. 177.
- 21 P. Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, Princeton) 1978.

- 22 P. Evans, *ibid.*
- 23 See H. Lim, *Dependent Development in the World System: The Case of South Korea, 1963-1979* (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, 1982); T. Gold, *Dependent Development in Taiwan* (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, 1981). See also S. Kim, *The State, Public Policy & NIC Development* (Dae Young Moonwhasa [Tae'yŏng munhwasal], Seoul, 1988), pp.12-19.
- 24 Mimeographed copy, *United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for action, 1962*. See also C. Cockburn, "The Role of Social Security in Development," *International Social Security Review*, No. 3/4 (1980), pp.337-358.
- 25 The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Report), *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (Pan Books, London, 1980), p.48.
- 26 Lesson and Nixon, "Development economics and the state," in Lesson and Minogue (eds), *Perspectives on Development: Cross-disciplinary themes in development* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988).
- 27 A. Kohli, *et al.*, "Inequality in the Third World: An Assessment of Competing Explanations," *Comparative Political Studies*, 17/3 (Oct 1984).
- 28 *Ibid.* p.289.
- 29 As far as the distribution structure of Korea is concerned, Kuznet's hypothesis, which shows how inequality is deepened in the initial phase of industrialisation, and how at a certain level of industrialisation it is improved, could be applied. For details of the income distributions of Korea and Taiwan, refer to *Social Indicators in Korea* (National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Bureau, Seoul, 1990); *Han'guk kwa Taemane ūi sanūp kujowa kyōngje sōnggwa (Industrial Structure and Economic Achievement of Korea and Taiwan)*, 2nd ed. (KIET, Seoul, 1989); *Taiwan Economic Statistics* (Overall Planning Department, CEPD, Taipei, 1990); *Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China* (Department of Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Taipei, 1990). The Gini coefficient of developed countries varies as follows: Australia (1973-4) 0.300, Austria (1974) 0.413, Canada (1977) 0.402, Britain (1977-8), 0.372, U.S.A (1978) 0.364. Source: *Social Indicators in Korea* (National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Bureau, Seoul, 1990), pp.386-7.
- 30 Bruce Cumings, "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product

- cycles, and political consequences," *International Organisation*, 38/1 (Winter 1984), p.1.
- 31 What is more, their economic development has been more and more highly appraised compared with the frustrated economic situations of developing countries where the "promises of developmentalism" have never been realised. See, for example, C. Clark, *Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms* (Greenwood Press, New York, 1989), p.18.
- 32 See T. Skocpol, *et al.* (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985).
- 33 Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Myth of South Korea," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (Aug 1989), pp.46-7.
- 34 D. Hulme and M. Turner, *op. cit.* pp.216-7. For more details, see D. Booth, "Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse," *World Development*, 13/7 (1985); L. Sklair, "Transcending the impasse: metatheory, theory, and empirical research in the sociology of development," *World Development*, 16/6 (1988); P. Vandergeest and F. Buttel, "Marx, Weber, and development sociology: beyond the impasse," *World Development*, 16/6 (1988).
- 35 B. Berberroglu, "Toward a Theory of State Capitalist Development in the Third World," *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 9, p.20. Wallerstein argues that weak state in the periphery and strong state in the core enables the latter to enforce relations of unequal exchange over the former. See, I. Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979).
- 36 According to Koo, three conditions in Third World countries contribute to the autonomy of the state: "the peripheral economies typically contain more than one mode of production;" "there is a historical condition that is related to a strong bureaucracy in those Third World countries that had colonial experiences;" "a relatively new pattern of dependent development in the periphery of the world capitalist economy has also strengthened the role of the states in peripheral (and semi-peripheral) nations." See H. Koo, "World System, Class, and State in Third World Development: Towards an Integrative Framework of Political Economy," *Sociological Perspectives*, 27/1 (Jan 1984), 43-4.
- 37 A. Kohli, *The State and Development in the Third World* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986) p.17.

- 38 L. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p.18.
- 39 Cline argues "it is seriously misleading to hold up the East Asian G-4 as a model for development because that model almost certainly cannot be generalised without provoking protectionist response..." See W. Cline, "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be Generalized?" *World Development*, 10/2 (1982), p.89.
- 40 D. Hulme and M. Turner, *op. cit.* p.220.
- 41 *Ibid*, p.220.
- 42 *Ibid*, p.220.
- 43 For instance, the Northern area of China in the 11th century produced 125,000 tons of iron per annum, which was far more than the iron output of Britain in the 18th century when it began to industrialise. Along with the most powerful iron-making capacities, the Ming dynasty had the strongest military force. Moreover, paper money was widely circulated in markets, and foreign trade was actively carried out with neighbouring countries such as Korea, Japan, South Asia and East Africa. See P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Unwin & Hyman, London, 1988), pp.4-9.
- 44 *Ibid*.
- 45 C. Clark, *op. cit.*, p.35.
- 46 See, for example, M. Weber, *The Religion of China* (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1951), chapter VI.
- 47 J. Kwōn, mimeographed copy.
- 48 *Ibid*.
- 49 J. Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 6/4 (1976); B. Berberoglu, "Toward a Theory of State Capitalist Development in the Third World," *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 9 (1979).
- 50 R. Duvall and J. Freeman, "The State and Dependent Capitalism," *International Studies Quarterly*, 25/1 (March 1981).
- 51 R. Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria* (Zed Books, London, 1986).

- 52 Cumings, *op. cit.*
- 53 S. Kim, *op. cit.*
- 54 N. Chow, *op. cit.*
- 55 Attempts have been made to view Third World welfare systems within the dependency perspective since the early 1980s. See, for example, J. Midgley, *Professional Imperialism: Social Work in the Third World*, (Heinemann, London, 1981). However it is not quite clear whether further works have been based on the premises of dependency theory.
- 56 J. Midgley, "Social Welfare Implications of Development Paradigms," *Social Service Review*, (June 1984), 185.
- 57 I. Roxborough, *Theories of Underdevelopment* (Macmillan, London, 1979), p.69.
- 58 A. Gordon, *Economics and Social Policy: An Introduction* (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982), p.14.
- 59 *Ibid*.
- 60 R. Mishra, *The Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought and Social Change* (Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex, 1984), chapter 1. See also S. Ringen, *The Possibility of Politics: A Study in the Political Economy of the Welfare State* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987), chapter 3.
- 61 R. Duvall and J. Freeman, *op. cit.*
- 62 In a discussion of the political impact of social services, George and Wilding argue that "the best that can be done at the moment...is to attempt a hopefully constructive use of the sociological imagination." See V. George and P. Wilding, *The Impact of Social Policy* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p.188.
- 63 B. Jessop, "Putting States in Their Place: State Systems and State Theory," in A. Leftwich (ed.), *New Developments in Political Science: An International Review of Achievements and Prospects* (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990).
- 64 G. Therborn, "Karl Marx Returning," *International Political Science Review*, 7/2 (Apr 1986), p.132.

- 65 S. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics*, 16/2 (Jan. 1984), pp.223-246.
- 66 In Britain, some 30% of GDP goes in spending on social security, education, health and housing. See B. Jones, *et al* (eds), *Politics UK* (Philip Allen, London, 1990), chapter 25.
- 67 M. Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984), p.3. See also S. Kim, *op. cit.* pp.19-22.
- 68 Data for this figure was obtained from various sources.
- 69 Mishra clearly summarizes the different approaches to welfare into five types: Welfare as Social Reform (Social Administration or Piecemeal Social Engineering), Welfare as Citizenship, Industrialisation and Social Welfare (Convergence Theory or Technological Determinism), Functionalist View, and Marxist Perspective. R. Mishra (1981), *op. cit.*

## THE EXCAVATION OF SONGGUNGNI SHELL MIDDENS ON ANMYŎN ISLAND, KOREA

DEOG-IM AN

### The Environment of the Island

Anmyŏn island lies just off the central west coast of the Korean peninsula, about 150km southwest from Seoul (Fig.1). It was originally a small peninsula attached to the mainland, allowing people and animals easy access to the area via a land route. In the 17th century, during the Chosŏn dynasty, it was artificially made into an island when a canal was cut at the top of the small peninsula to facilitate sea transport. The island remained cut off from the mainland until the construction of a bridge in 1970.

Currently, the island's total area is about 87.96 square km. It is 6km wide and 22km long. Geologically, the island is composed of mainly Pre-Cambrian quartzite and quartz schist. The topography is hilly, but 60% of the island is today less than 50m above sea level. The highest point is 97m high. The coastline is ria-type with a total length of